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• 
Curriculum, Pedagogy, and 
Teacherly Ethos 
Marshall Gregory 
Curriculum versus Pedagogy 
In considering how curriculum and teaching influence education, it is reveal-
ing to note that most faculty members treat curriculum the way bankers treat 
investments. They generally spend much time, planning, and careful thought 
on curricular matters-reasoning here, analyzing there, relying on experi-
ence, and carefully considering both the long-term and short-term dividends 
of knowledge - but when it comes to teaching, many faculty members operate 
less like bankers and more like barnstormers, flying by the seat of their pants 
and guiding themselves primarily by instinct or by repeating whatever worked 
yesterday. Few teachers feel that they have either the intellectual or profes-
sional grasp of teaching that they have of curriculum. Plato's complaint about 
poets and politicians (as opposed to craftsmen or philosophers)-that they 
always operate by rules of thumb, even when they are brilliant, and thus can 
neither explain how they do what they do nor teach the doing of it to others-
describes all teachers at least some of the time. 
All teachers need to remember that exposing students to a well-
thought-out curriculum is not the same thing as educating them, if educating 
them means, as I think it does, helping them learn how to integrate the con-
tents of the curriculum into their minds, hearts, and everyday lives. Much of 
the time, academic considerations of education bracket off to the side the all-
important fact that teaching not only influences but often determines what 
students make of the curriculum. A good illustration of my point is offered by 
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Martha Nussbaum's fine book on liberal education, Cultivating Humanity 
(1997). While I agree with Nussbaum's argument about the value of integrat-
ing new foci of liberal arts education with the old foci, it is interesting that the 
whole book is argued in terms of curricular content. Teaching and pedagogy 
do not appear in the index, and the chapter titles-"Narrative Imagination," 
"Study of Non-Western Cultures," "African-American Studies;' "Women's 
Studies," "Human Sexuality," and so on-reveal clearly the emphasis on cur-
riculum rather than pedagogy. 
It is important for teachers to remember that great texts, fine art, and 
liberating topics are not automatically or transparently great, fine, and liberat-
ing to most students. (In all honesty, this goes for most teachers as well.) Just 
like our students now, most of our own interests when we were students were 
not fired merely by coming into the presence of great art or great books or 
lofty topics. More likely than not, our interests were fired by the example of a 
teacher who seemed filled, somehow, with a special kind of life because of his 
or her love of a particular subject or discipline. As I look back, I realize that 
one commonality shared by all my favorite teachers is the way they seemed 
filled and animated by presences-by Jane Austen's power of language, by 
Kant's depth of thought, by Wollstonecraft's powerful arguments about the 
education of women, by the spirit of Bach's music, by whatever. In addition, I 
found that the larger life these presences gave my teachers was in itself com-
pelling to me. I was drawn to this larger life the way iron filings are drawn to a 
magnet. Once there, I found myself delightfully attracted, pleasurably bonded. 
In his most recent book, The Courage to Teach, Parker Palmer (1998: 
21) says that "the power of our mentors ... is in their capacity to awaken a 
truth within us, a truth we can reclaim years later by recalling their impact on 
our lives." This special power of teachers to infect others with the virus of 
their own passion for learning often gives teachers more power than they 
either realize or want. As Wayne Booth (1988: 298) says in The Vocation of a 
Teacher, "Anyone who embraces teaching as a vocation takes on considerable 
power with that embrace .... When college teachers are fully successful, they 
are successful beyond any of their conscious intentions about particular sub-
jects: they make converts, they make souls that have been turned around to 
face a given way of being and moving in the world." Although everyone pays 
lip service to the value of "good teaching," few teachers (Booth is an obvious 
and well-known exception) take time to think deeply about this power, about 
the special opportunities it offers or the special responsibilities it imposes, but 
I think our avoidance has less to do with time than with the fact that we are 
not sure what to do with this power. We are not sure how best to employ it, 
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and we naturally shrink from fully facing the damage we might do if we fail to 
use it responsibly. So we think about curriculum instead. Indeed, we think so 
hard and exclusively about curriculum that we sometimes forget the obvious 
fact that curriculum seldom shapes anyone on its own but shapes us, instead, 
as a consequence of how we are directed, informed, and led inside that cur-
riculum by a teacher. 
An exaggerated and misguided belief in the automatic influence of 
great books and great art (evaluated apart from teaching) often lies at the heart 
of the confused and highly controversial accusations against liberal education 
made by thinkers such as George Steiner, who seem never to tire of pointing 
out that the liberal education received by many of Europe's political leaders 
in the early part of the twentieth century did nothing to prevent the Holocaust 
or the spread of fascism across Europe in the middle years of the century. The 
traditional belief going back at least to the Renaissance was that a classical 
curriculum automatically turned students into morally refined and sensitive 
persons. When that turned out not to be the case, the backlash against the 
imputed moral benefits of the classical liberal arts curriculum turned out to be 
strong and enduring. 
We now know ... that the formal excellence and numerical extension of education 
need not correlate with increased social stability and political rationality .... In other 
words, the libraries, museums, theatres, universities, research centers, in and through 
which the transmission of the humanities and of the sciences mainly takes place, can 
prosper next to the concentration camps .... Men such as Hans Frank who 
administered the "final solution" in Eastern Europe were avid connoisseurs and, in 
some instances, performers of Bach and Mozart. We know of personnel in the 
bureaucracy of the torturers and of the ovens who cultivated a knowledge of Goethe, 
a love of Rilke. (Steiner 1971: 77) 
The presumption behind this and many similar accusations is that the content 
of education counts for everything or for nothing. What is never considered 
in such accusations-and insofar as I know, "never" is not an exaggeration-
is the relationship between content and pedagogy. I am not claiming that good 
pedagogy would have made all the difference, that the Holocaust and the 
spread of fascism would never have occurred if teachers had only done a bet-
ter job, but I do find it curious that the alleged failure of the classical curricu-
lum is never analyzed within the context of the pedagogy of the day, a peda-
gogy which in fact presumed that curriculum is all, that texts teach themselves, 
and that the curriculum would automatically impose its benefits on students. 
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For centuries the pedagogy of the classical curriculum was a dry and 
sterile pedagogy of grammar instruction, not a pedagogy of ideas, values, crit-
ical thinking, historical perspective, moral deliberation, argumentation, or 
logical reasoning. What students did with the classical curriculum they were 
"learning" was in fact not to learn it at all but merely to translate it-a given 
number of lines a day - and what they were judged on was not their thoughts 
about it, or their criticism of it, or their ability to connect its content with their 
own social, political, or private lives, but merely the technical (grammatical) 
accuracy of their translation. End of pedagogical story. Writing near the end 
of the nineteenth century, Thomas Henry Huxley (1938) gives a vivid portrait 
of the kind of pedagogy I am here describing. He asks, "What is to be said of 
classical teaching at its worst, or in other words, of the classics of our ordinary 
middle-class schools?" And he goes on to answer his own question, rather 
bitterly: 
I will tell you. It means getting up endless forms and rules by heart. It means turning 
Latin and Greek into English, for the mere sake of being able to do it, and without 
the smallest regard to the worth, or worthlessness, of the author read. It means the 
learning of innumerable, not always decent, fables in such a shape that the meaning 
they once had is dried up into utter trash; and the only impression left upon a 
boy's mind is, that the people who believed such things must have been the greatest 
idiots the world ever saw. (1325) 
Clearly, the failure of the classical curriculum in England and Europe, 
a failure that has so exercised such people as Steiner, may perhaps be as well 
described, or perhaps better described, as a failure of pedagogy. In light of a 
pedagogy that stonewalled real student learning, that allowed students to 
avoid ever confronting what they were learning with what they believed about 
the world or how they conducted themselves in it, then of course it follows 
that such learning, which was learning in name only, would have no effect on 
the tremendous pressures in culture that pushed for social intolerance and, 
ultimately, ethnic genocide. The only possible response to such accusations as 
Steiner's and others' is that of course the classical curriculum failed to deflect 
such overriding influences on social life in Europe as nationalistic arrogance, 
centuries of anti-Semitism, territorial greed, racist bigotry, the injustice of 
World War I political settlements, and so on. Anyone who ever thought that 
translating a requisite number of lines of the Aeneid every day as a purely 
grammatical exercise would automatically produce citizens of superior sen-
sitivity and morality was surely not thinking but merely repeating delusory 
bromides. 
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We can learn at least two things from the "failure" of the classical cur-
riculum. First, we can learn that to expect any educational curriculum or sys-
tem to make human beings morally virtuous in itself will always be an expecta-
tion absurdly and naively too high. Cardinal Newman (1852: 145), a realist in 
such matters, expresses the needed insight here with intellectual depth and 
poetic grace. "Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a 
thread of silk," he says, "then you may hope with such keen and delicate 
instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those 
giants, the passion and the pride of man." Even non-Christians can easily see 
that Newman's location of the causes of moral failure in passion and pride is 
less naive, more searching, than the anguished anger of those who expected 
that, somehow, the classical liberal education of their youth in the first 
decades of the century should have "saved" Europe from war and genocide in 
the thirties and forties. 
The second thing we can learn is that the effects of curriculum should 
never be considered in isolation from the kind of pedagogy that delivers that 
curriculum. This does not mean that a particular pedagogy will "save" civi-
lization any more than a particular curriculum, but it does mean that if we 
want to know how or why a curriculum either works or doesn't, we have to 
consider how we teach it, for none of its contents is transparently or auto-
matically predictable. Surely the "failure" of the classical liberal arts curricu-
lum in Europe was also and perhaps even primarily a failure of pedagogy. The 
potential advantages to heart and mind offered by the curriculum of the clas-
sics were effectively masked for most students by a pedagogy that deflected all 
genuine encounters with the classics in favor of a sterile pedagogy of right or 
wrong answers about verb irregularities, tenses, declensions, and inflections. 
The fundamental reason why pedagogy deserves careful thought is 
that pedagogy is the primary force, the engine, that accomplishes the "leading 
out" (from Latin educare) that lies as the etymological source of educate and 
that also describes education's most basic aim. Since at birth all human skills 
and forms of development are mere potentialities, it follows that we have to go 
someplace else in the world from where we are at any given time-we have to 
be led out, or educated-in order to turn those potentialities into realities. As 
Bartlett Giamatti (1976: 194) has said, "Teaching is an instinctual art, mindful 
of potential, craving of realization." The content of any curriculum, whether 
a single course or a whole program of study, seldom exerts a sufficient pull on 
a person's imagination to draw him or her out of the inertia of being a stand-
ing body and into the activity that takes mind and heart to new places and new 
levels of development. What does exert this pull is the sight of another human 
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being who has gone there before us and who brings back the good news: 
how exciting it is to read Shakespeare's plays! how transporting to learn 
about string theory or recursive functions! how uplifting to understand the 
relation between form and content in a Platonic dialogue or a piano sonata! 
and so on. In his famous essay, "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," 
William James (1958: 149) hazards the observation that "our judgments con-
cerning the worth of things, big or little, depend on the feelings the things 
arouse in us. Where we judge a thing to be precious in consequence of the 
idea we frame of it, this is only because the idea is itself associated already 
with a feeling. If we were radically feelingless, and if ideas were the only 
things our mind could entertain, we should lose all our likes and dislikes at a 
stroke, and be unable to point to anyone situation or experience in life more 
valuable or significant than any other." The significance of this keen insight 
for teaching is this: if it is curriculum that contains and displays the idea, it is 
teaching that bonds the student's mind to the idea by creating the feelings 
that make the importance of the idea a vital force in the life of the student. 
Teachers are the good-news messengers-the exemplars-who create for 
curriculum what I call a "context of feeling" that turns curricular content 
into a burrowing force that gets under our skin, that irritates our natural self-
satisfaction and by so doing turns it into the kind of dissatisfaction that only 
real learning can salve. 
A curriculum in the catalog isn't worth a hill of beans to most students 
except as a list of requirements, and students are quite right to think that the 
only real meaning the curriculum possesses for them is its delivery or non-
delivery by teachers in their everyday classrooms. In Aristotle's account of the 
imitative arts, he makes clear his view that no work of art finds its proper 
fulfillment, its "final cause," until it has elicited the appropriate response from 
an understanding auditor. The fulfillment of teaching follows a parallel 
course. Teaching finds its final cause when it is taken in by students who 
understand, who acknowledge its power, and who respond to it not just 
with intelligence but with pleasure. This fulfillment is accomplished in the 
classroom-not in the catalog or on any other piece of paper-or it is accom-
plished nowhere. 
Teachers' Methods, Students' Criteria 
If the job of administrators and teachers is to create the terms and practice of 
good education, then what kind of teaching is most appropriate to this end? 
Many teachers try to answer this question in terms of method, but I am fre-
quently unhappy with answers that rely heavily on method, for they almost 
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always assume that one method or another will solve all problems. Most analy-
ses of methods assume that one method, simply because of its inherent pow-
ers, will automatically yield better teaching than the others. But if students 
vary in their responsiveness to different methods, which they do, and if the 
skills and forms of awareness that we wish to teach students are as varied as 
the situations and contexts of life itself, which they are, then it follows that no 
one teaching method can meet all the demands of learning. Sometimes lecture 
will work best, sometimes collegiality and fellow-learning, sometimes Socratic 
needling, and so on. Every good teacher should be able to vary pedagogical 
practice to meet the needs of student learning not according to some abstract 
definition (such as "collaborative learning is always best") and not according 
to some ideological commitment to a single method (such as "the democratic 
'student-centered' classroom") but according to the demands of the material 
and the needs of students on any given day. Concern for method should 
always be a concern for methods. 
The weakness of an excessive reliance on method can be exposed by 
a single, two-pronged question: what kinds of student development do we 
want, and what kinds of teaching promote those kinds? Whether we are talk-
ing about liberal education or professional education or technical education 
it is development, after all, that we want from our students, and it is by the 
extent of students' development that teachers measure their own success or 
failure. Not even in the most technical or professional programs of education 
do we expect to turn out students who have a once-and-for-all doneness about 
them, like turned table legs or bronze castings. We want to put students on the 
path of developing powers that they will continue to use-and continue to 
develop - throughout their lives, and if none of us thinks that students should 
concentrate on only one form of development, then it follows that no one 
method will serve all needs. 
Besides, there is at least one fundamental need that is obscured by a 
myopic focus on methods: the fundamental need for practice. Practice on the 
part of the student fosters development more than one method pushed by the 
teacher. Weight lifters lift heavier and heavier weights; dancers endure count-
less classes and rehearsals; students read, write, and organize their thoughts 
over and over. Practice, however, is not just a repetition of sameness. If I 
repeat a skill I am learning over and over in exactly the same way, it follows 
that I will repeat the skill at exactly the same level of proficiency. Practice has 
to be governed not merely by a repetition of sameness but by two mental 
activities: first, by criticism, the ability to see the imperfections in the perform-
ance so far, and, second, by imagination, the ability to visualize the perform-
Gregory. Curriculum, Pedagog;y, and Teacherly Ethos 75 
ance or the skill not as it is actually being done now but as it might be done in 
the future, differently and better, after more practice. 
The very concept of practice recognizes the inevitability of interim 
failure. If we did a thing right the first time we would not need to practice it. 
Real learning is always risky because the possibility of failure is always real. 
There is always the possibility for the student of being inadequate or simply 
getting something wrong: the date, the formula, the explanation, the interpre-
tation, the cause, the analysis, or whatever. Some students want teachers to 
address risk simply by minimizing it, but this is surely unproductive and self-
defeating. Progress requires risk. The most productive way of addressing risk, 
therefore, is not by minimizing it but by supporting it. Helping students to 
take risks required for progress is an absolutely necessary teaching strategy, 
and students' sense of being supported sufficiently to take risks depends more 
on teacher ethos than on any other single variable. 
Whether we are lifting weights or dancing or learning Middle English, 
none of us gets it right the first time-and neither do our students-which 
points up a potential conflict between teacher desires and student needs. 
While teachers feel pressed to cover more and more material in their disci-
pline, what students need is time to make mistakes, to correct them, to fail and 
try again - and they need teachers who can help them view each failure as 
merely interim, as merely a halt in forward progress, not as a terminaljudg-
ment on their abilities. Taking this kind of time in class, not to mention estab-
lishing the personal relations of trust that make it work, would force many 
teachers to revise their pedagogy considerably and even, perhaps, to elevate 
pedagogy above curriculum. Most teachers at present would find it difficult to 
consider fully the practical reforms that such ideas point to, for these ideas 
suggest, simply, that we must all, as Gerald Graff (1990) says, worry less about 
coverage and more about helping students find reasons to become engaged. 
And one way to foster engagement is to allow practice. Conceptually as well as 
practically, the notion of practice as a learning tool is not simple, for analogies 
between students and dancers and weight lifters begin to break down when 
we consider that learning to be a developed human being involves more skills 
and more forms of awareness than either dancing or weight lifting. The impli-
cations become not only boggling for what we might call "conventional peda-
gogy," but highly suggestive for teacherly ethos. A teacherly ethos of seaInless 
and impenetrable authority, for example-an ethos that suggests that the 
teacher never had to practice in order to learn because he or she first grasped 
knowledge the way Athena sprang from the head of Zeus, fully formed - pre-
sents an immensely different, and potentially forbidding, teacherly ethos to 
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students. On the other hand, a teacherly ethos that suggests that the teacher, 
like his or her students, not only did practice but still has to practice in order 
to improve - at writing, at argumentation, at close reading - both models 
what students need to see in order to learn themselves and shows them how to 
assume that model on their own. 
One of the attractions for a concentration on method is that method, 
like curriculum, can be intellectualized and theorized more easily than teach-
ing, which often has to be done on the wing. But rather than tum all consid-
erations of teaching into considerations of method, teachers could better help 
their students and themselves if they learned to look at teaching from the stu-
dent's point of view. Such a view suggests at once that students care little 
about what method their teachers use but do care immensely about what 
kinds of persons their teachers are. Without using the word ethos, ethos is 
nevertheless a primary concern for most students. It may strike many teach-
ers as unpleasant and perhaps even unfair that the most important variable in 
the chemical mix that produces student learning or student stalling in the 
classroom is the students' sense of who their teachers are as persons. Some 
teachers may resist-"What difference does it make what kind of person I am 
as long as I really know what I claim to know within my discipline?" - but this 
question misses the point. What student learners see in front of them as they 
enter a classroom is not a disembodied skill or a dissociated idea but a person 
who has mastery over a skill or possession of an idea, and the first thing stu-
dents respond to is whether the value of the skill or idea is recommended by 
the manner and the mind-in short, the ethos-of the teacher. Teacherly 
ethos - who the teacher seems to be as a person - only increases in influence 
(although that influence may be negative as well as positive) the longer and 
more deeply the student becomes acquainted with the teacher.l 
If the teacher exhibits an ethos of passion, commitment, deep interest, 
involvement, honesty, curiosity, excitement, and so on, then what students are 
moved to imitate is not the skill or the idea directly, but the passion, commit-
ment, excitement, and interest that clearly vivifies the life of the teacher. 
Everyone-we teachers included-loves imitating an ethos that says, "I love 
knowing this stuff about opera or calculus or chemistry." Such enthusiasm 
justifies our efforts as learners because we, too, want to know things that will 
make us love our lives more. Then, at that point, and only at that point-when 
we are moved as students to want what the teacher has and is as a person - do 
we as students begin to place high value on the skill or the idea that the 
teacher is trying to teach us. It's never just for the sake of the skill or idea alone 
that the learner learns it, but for the sake of the life that is heightened, vivified, 
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intensified, and enriched by means of the skill or idea. The possibility of such 
added value to learning can never be conveyed by the skill or idea alone, but 
only by the ethos of the teacher who has already integrated those skills and 
ideas into his or her life and thus offers us as students, via an appropriately 
vivid teacherly ethos, an existential invitation to, an existential reason for, 
learning. 2 
Teachers may not like being assessed by students in deeply personal 
ways - as likable or worthy of respect as human beings - but teachers don't 
have the option of not being assessed this way, and they don't have to like it in 
order to concede that such evaluations both always occur and always playa 
crucial role in student learning. Besides, likability as a student criterion is gen-
erally not as simpleminded - and therefore not as deserving of resentment or 
contempt-as some teachers may fear. In my experience, not even the least 
thoughtful student reduces a teacher's likability to mere good looks or enter-
tainment skills. To students, evaluations of likability and respect rest primarily 
on five criteria: their views of the teacher's trustworthiness; their views of 
the teacher's competence; their views of the teacher's depth of commitment to 
the importance or value of the skills and ideas being taught; their views of the 
teacher's dedication not just to teaching as a profession but to students as per-
sons; and their views of the teacher's commitment to fairness. These five crite-
ria are applied to the teacher not as an exemplar of a particular pedagogical 
method or as the possessor of a particular level of professional expertise but 
as a human being, as a moral agent. Teachers who show up late, who never 
quite get the syllabus passed out, or who react defensively to student ques-
tions can be said to behave unprofessionally, but this language masks the fact 
that the problem in such cases is only marginally professional and primarily 
personal. The issues are trustworthiness and respect, and students begin mak-
ingjudgments not only about trustworthiness and respect but also about com-
petence, commitment, dedication, and fairness from the moment the teacher 
walks into the classroom on the very first day, long before they are aware that 
he or she prefers any particular teaching method. Students don't separate 
method from ethos, and they are quite right not to do so. To students, we are 
what we do. 
Teacherly Ethos: A Friendship Model 
The model that I wish to recommend to teachers is a model not so much 
about what to do as about who to be. I wish to recommend an "ethotic" model 
of friendship - a very specific kind of friendship - but I must carefully define 
what I mean by it, for I mean something that is in some respects quite different 
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from and in other respects directly contrary to definitions of friendship that 
prevail in popular culture. One of the difficulties in recommending an ethotic 
model of friendship is that contemporary society has nearly abandoned any 
sustained discourse about friendship altogether. Ronald Sharp (1986: 4) asks, 
Why is it that there has been so little serious writing about friendship in recent years? 
Love, sex, and marriage have been the central subjects of a great variety of serious 
twentieth-century literature, but with very few exceptions, friendship - which up 
through the nineteenth century remained a major issue for serious writers and 
philosophers - seems to have fallen mainly into the hands of pop psychologists and 
self-help enthusiasts .... As Wayne Booth [1980] has observed ... "after millennia 
during which [friendship] was one of the major philosophical topics, the subject of 
thousands of books and tens of thousands of essays, it has now dwindled to the 
point that our encyclopedias do not even mention it." 
Whatever the whys of the disappearance of discourse about friendship, its 
paucity renders recommendations based on a model of friendship less clear 
than they would have been a hundred years ago. Yet this model must be 
rightly understood if it is to assist teachers in thinking about their teaching 
in deeper and more creative ways, and "rightly understood" means, first, 
separating the friendship model I am recommending from a friendship 
model of buddies or other kinds of companions who share a lot of social time 
and activities together.3 Most of all, the model of friendship I recommend 
must be separated from contemporary images of friendship in movies and on 
television. 
Friends as contemporary television and movies portray them share 
mutual interests in entertainment and something universally called a "life-
style," and they are supposed to like and support each other-to "be there" 
(as the buzz phrase goes) is the friend'sjob-but friends do not offer serious 
criticism of each other in either intellectual or moral terms. Unlike teachers, 
friends on TV sitcoms do not judge each other. (This is true despite that fact 
that TV sitcoms contain a lot of ridicule, but flippant ridicule and deliberative 
judging are not the same thing.) Being described as a "non judgmental kind of 
person," on the friendship front, is a big compliment on TV sitcoms. On 
occasions when serious judgments might be forthcoming, the evaluating 
friend who is violating the non judgmental dictum is typically warned, "Back 
off, I have a right to make my own decisions;' or "Back off, what gives you the 
right to judge me?" or "Back off, I have to do what Ifeel is right, not what you 
say is right," and, according to current notions, the moralizing friend has to do 
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just that: back off. Without anyone's having to say so explicitly, this dynamic 
presumes that intellectual and moral integrity is decided upon solely by the 
individual agent and that intellectual and moral principles are pretty much 
what Alasdair MacIntyre (1981: 11) in After Virtue accuses them of being, that 
is, "nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling." 
If, on the sitcoms, a friend is definitely non judgmental, a friend is also 
definitely cool. In particular, I am referring to the attitude of ironic detachment 
that young people learn primarily from television. David Foster Wallace (1997: 
63 - 64) describes this demeanor with vivid clarity: 
To the extent that [television] can train viewers to laugh at characters' unending 
put-downs of one another, to view ridicule as both the mode of social intercourse and 
the ultimate art-form, television can reinforce its own queer ontology of appearance: 
the most frightening prospect, for the well-conditioned viewer, becomes leaving 
oneself open to others' ridicule by betraying passe expressions of value, emotion, or 
vulnerability. Other people become judges; the crime is naivete .... 
In fact, the numb blank bored demeanor . .. that has become my generation's version 
of cool is all about TV . ... Indifference is actually just the "90S" version of frugality 
for U.S. young people: wooed several gorgeous hours a day for nothing but our 
attention, we regard that attention as our chief commodity, our social capital, and we 
are loath to fritter it. In the same regard, we see that in 1990, flatness, numbness, and 
cynicism in one's demeanor are clear ways to transmit the televisual attitude of stand-
out transcendence -flatness and numbness transcend sentimentality, and cynicism 
announces that one knows the score, was last naive about something at maybe like age 
four. (my emphasis) 
Clearly, insofar as Wallace's description of student ethos is accurate, teaching 
and learning will both be affected. Jane Tompkins's (1990) famous account of 
her graduate class at Duke in which personal emotions suddenly erupted illu-
minates the issue, for the greatest consternation among the participants was 
not the content of the emotion itself, or even the reasons behind it, but its 
sheer appearance, its disruption of the "everything's cool" surface of class-
room relations. Deborah Chappel (1992: 21), a teacher who was a student in 
Tompkins's graduate class, provides an account of the students' perspective: 
I was suddenly aware in that moment in Tompkins's class how relentlessly I'd been 
taught to keep overt displays of emotion and even conscious recognition of emotion 
out of the learning environment, to such an extreme that even to see a student really 
caring what went on in the classroom embarrassed and frightened me .... And I 
began to wonder why our expectation about school had been constructed in such a 
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way that the most socially acceptable emotion is denial that what goes on in the 
classroom really matters to the student on a personal, individual level. 
Taken together, Wallace's and Chappel's comments suggest that teachers who 
are frustrated by their failure to strike sparks from students may simply not 
have noticed how generally pervasive the obligatory demeanor of cool has 
become. 
In the contemporary context of cool detachment, cynical put-downs, 
and never letting on that one is naive about anything, friendship is being pres-
sured to reconfigure itself as something that we might well call "the convoca-
tion of the cool." Sometimes teachers attempt to join the convocation of the 
cool themselves, a tendency especially noticeable in older teachers who per-
sist in holding on to their own but increasingly distant cool from graduate 
school days. When this tendency takes over, however, responsible pedagogy 
suffers. As James Banner and Harold Cannon (1997: 113) say, "Teachers 
should try to become, as teachers, the people they are .... Teachers who 
impersonate themselves at earlier points in their careers invite ridicule." 
In a much-discussed essay on liberal education in Harper's magazine, 
Mark Edmundson (1997) reflects on the views of himself as a teacher offered 
by his students on course evaluation forms. He is particularly struck by the 
way his students approve of his cool but also reveal to him a disquieting and 
flabby kind of friendliness devoid of rigor or sharp edges: 
I have to admit that I do not much like the image of myself that emerges from these 
[student evaluation] forms, the image of knowledgeable, humorous detachment 
and bland tolerance .... I'm disturbed by the serene belief that my function -and, 
more important, Freud's, or Shakespeare's, or Blake's-is to divert, entertain, and 
interest. Observes one respondent, not at all unrepresentative: "Edmundson has done 
a fantastic job of presenting this difficult, important & controversial material in an 
enjoyable and approachable way." 
Thanks but no thanks. I don't teach to amuse, to divert, or even, for that matter, to 
be merely interesting ... but the affability and the one-liners often seem to be all that 
land with the students ... . 
Why are my students describing the Oedipus complex and the death drive as 
being interesting and enjoyable to contemplate? And why am I coming across as 
an urbane, mildly ironic, endlessly affable guide to this intellectual territory, operating 
without intensity, generous, funny, and loose? (39 - 40 ) 
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The Ethos of Befriending versus Being Friendly 
The model of friendship I would offer as an alternative to flabby friendliness 
is better expressed, perhaps, by the active verb befriend than by the passive 
verb be friendly. Being friendly indicates merely a state of being or, even 
more weakly, only a conventional pleasantness. But being friendly is not syn-
onymous with befriending. Aristotle offered one of the earliest and most 
enduring definitions of friendship as befriending, and it is still a useful 
definition for countering the endlessly uncritical and cooly flip versions of 
friendship offered to us on television and in movies. In his Rhetoric, Aristo-
tle (1952: 626) defines friendship as the "feeling towards anyone as wishing 
for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, 
and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about." On this 
view, friends don't just support us or endlessly agree with us or weakly 
back off from us. If they see us doing something bad (and thus bad for us) or 
failing to reach for some good that would improve us, then these kinds of 
friends, Aristotle's kind, sometimes get in our face; they help us improve our-
selves, not for their own satisfaction but for our own good. In friendship-as-
befriending, we find a model for the teacher who helps students achieve the 
kinds of development that are good for them simply because it is good for 
them. This view does not force teachers to impose a monolithic agenda of 
development on their students ("Listen up: I know what's best for you!"), 
but it does require knowing the difference between being tolerant and being 
uncritical. 4 
The befriending model of teaching is not the same thing as merely 
wishing for others what they wish for themselves. None of us always knows 
what is best for us, and even when we do, we don't always want it. All of us 
require, at times, help from our friends, not only to discover what really is 
good for us but to improve what we desire. Discussing things with friends 
helps us clear our own heads, but when our friends befriend us rather than 
give us flabby friendliness, we have to be prepared to receive instruction, crit-
icism, or even reproof. Likewise, when teachers befriend students, we do not 
merely feel for them, and we certainly do not feel just as they feel. Friendship 
from a befriending teacher is likely to be challenging, not merely friendly. 
Befriending is not a touchy-feely, I'm-OK-you're-OK activity, nor does 
befriending students entail being personally intimate with them, or sharing 
personal secrets with them, or sharing the same tastes in entertainment and 
"lifestyle," or being the same age, and it certainly does not entail uncritical 
acceptance of their failures or mistakes. Primarily, the kind of teacherly 
befriending I am talking about entails creating an atmosphere of classroom 
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trust in which the teacher's willingness to call a bad job a badjob is seen by 
the student as helpful and productive rather than as mean and destructive. 
Teachers who have earned this kind of trust help create students who 
are willing to take the risk of real engagement, the risk of failure, and the com-
mitment to practice that constitute the grounds of learning. Once this trust 
is present, any teaching method can be productive. Teachers whose students 
know they are befriending them can lecture productively, discuss produc-
tively, imitate Socrates productively, or swing from the chandelier pro-
ductively. Students can best learn the skills of criticism and imagination-
especially when it is themselves they need to criticize and the course of their 
own lives they must imagine-when they have teachers whose critical and 
imaginative activity they can imitate. 
No single model or single list will solve all problems of pedagogy, but 
the following list of ten ethical qualities may provide a useful guide for helping 
teachers see more clearly the complicated relations among curriculum, peda-
gogy, and teacherly ethos. 
Honesty 
Teachers should be honest about what they know and don't know. We get annoyed 
when students cover their ignorance by "bulling" their way through exams and papers, 
but sometimes these student cover-ups seem merely a model of teacherly "bull;' 
dished out by egoistic or insecure teachers on the mistaken assumption that presenting 
a seamless front of impregnable knowledge automatically bestows teacherly credibility. 
Teachers should alS!) be honest with students about the nonquantifiable dimensions 
of grading. That nonquantifiable thing called "professionaljudgment" can and should 
be defended, not masked behind the pretense that everything a student does is 
transparendy equivalent to a mathematically derived number. 
U npretentiousness 
Pretentiousness and pedantry are the bane of good pedagogy and they are rooted in 
old-fashioned vanity. The patinas of pedantry and pretentiousness are not only ugly 
and dishonest but manipulative, for they are not strategies employed to "lead out" 
students. Pedantry and pretentiousness are bullying strategies. I have read many of the 
contemporary arguments in favor of obs~urantism in literary theory on the grounds 
that arcane and specialized jargon challenges the oppressive hegemony of middle-class 
values, but this self-serving rationalization is not only unconvincing with respect to 
literary theory, but absolutely deadly with respect to teaching. Without getting involved 
in the long controversies over the rightness or wrongness of all of the following 
statements, it is nevertheless clear that when we hear Socrates say that "the 
unexamined life is not worth living," or hear Jesus direct the rich young man to "sell all 
that you have and give it to the poor," or listen to Jefferson's claim that "all men are 
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created equal," or react to Wollstonecraft's indignant response to the patriarchy that 
"how grossly do they insult [women] who thus advise us only to render ourselves 
gende, domestic brutes!" or consider Engels's dictum that "religion is the opiate of the 
people," and, finally, when we listen to Marx assert that "life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life," what strikes us is that these utterances have 
not only shaped our world but are expressed in language that is accessible to everyone, 
not just an initiated coterie. Any discourse that aspires to influence must be expressed 
in a language that reaches its audience, and this is especially true of the language of 
good teaching. 
Curiosity 
The love of learning is the most important ingredient in the love of teaching. Teachers 
should make their teaching not just an important but an indispensable part of their own 
ongoing education. Doing so is the only way to avoid eventual burnout and sterility. 
Curiosity should include inquisitiveness about how the course content connects with 
the lives that both teachers and students are leading as human beings. In the words 
of bell hooks (1994: 17-19), "Teachers must be actively committed to a process of 
self-actualization that promotes their own well-being if they are to teach in a manner 
that empowers students .... [Students] rightfully expect that my colleagues and I will 
not offer them information without addressing the connection between what they are 
learning and their overall life experiences." Curiosity also implies the necessity of 
playfulness. We are not always curious merely about useful or necessary things, but 
about things that simply strike our fancy, and we don't always want to know something 
merely because we can see how to tum it to profit or use. Sometimes we want to know 
just for the fun of it, and learning as a kind of play is an experience that teachers need 
to help their students discover. As Kenneth Eble (198,'3: 57) says, "If we cannot be 
playful at all in teaching, we are probably ill suited for that vocation." 
Humor 
Human beings are not merely the only creatures who use real language, who make 
works of art, and who judge their conduct by moral standards, but they are also the 
only creatures who laugh. Laughter is an immensely important social lubricant. In the 
classroom, laughter must be collegial and beneficent, not spiteful or contemptuous, but 
when it is the former rather than the latter it can create more classroom cohesion and 
goodwill in a shorter time than almost any other form of human expression. It pulls the 
teeth out of danger and liberates students to try for their best performance even as they 
risk failure. Laughter can help teachers help students bridge the gap between their 
desires and their performance. 
Tolerance 
Teachers today are very concerned about tolerance for "the other" defined in racial, 
gender, class, or ethnic terms, but bad pedagogy rooted in these kinds of intolerance is 
not in my view either the main or the most pernicious version of intolerance in the 
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college classroom. I see very few teachers exhibiting class or race prejudices, but I 
do see and hear teachers expressing deep prejudice against students who are 
temperamentally and intellectually unlike themselves. Class, race, and gender aside, we 
tend to like students who, like us, are verbally fluent, who like books, and who already 
value the education we want so desperately to give them. Those who are like us in 
these ways get our approval regardless of their race, class, or gender. But those who are 
unlike us, who question the value of our education, who don't read our books, who 
play football rather than Scrabble, and who find movies and television more interesting 
than novels and science we too readily dismiss as impossible or uninteresting. We long 
ago ceased making hurtful ethnic jokes; now we need to cease stereotyping those we 
call 'jocks, boneheads, sorority bubbleheads, and frat boys." It's not that these 
stereotypes never have validity, but such validity is never a good defense for 
stereotyping whole groups. Liking those students best who mirror us most is just 
another form of teacherly vanity. 
Courage 
Teachers today need a lot of courage in order to stand up against many different 
pressures: pressure from the administration to keep retention figures up by keeping 
students happy, pressure from students not to push the envelope of their intellectual 
comfort too fast or too far, pressure from a society that wants greater "accountability" 
measured only by hours in the classroom, and, most discouraging of all, perhaps, 
pressure from students, administrators, some colleagues, and society at large to 
measure everything in education by a bottom-line ideology that is invoked as a mantra, 
never defended as an argument. 
Indignation 
Every teacher worth his or her salt needs the capacity to be indignant over time that is 
wasted, talents that lie fallow, red tape that gets in the way, students who refuse to put 
out their best effort, and so on. Throwing great gobs of gritty indignation into the hub 
of the status quo is one way to create that squeaky wheel that gets the grease. 
Passion 
A teacher who lacks passion for the twin activities of internal and social learning is not 
a real teacher. Please note that I am not assuming a uniform or monolithic expression of 
passion. I'm not assuming, for example, that all excitable teachers have the kind of 
passion that I'm talking about, or that all quiet and undemonstrative teachers lack it. 
The manifestation of passion may be loud, boisterous, and intense, or it may be quiet, 
introspective, and unassuming. But if it's there in any manifestation at all-or if it 
isn't-most students will know. However it gets manifested, passion is the engine that 
drives the pedagogical sense of urgency to obey E. M. Forster's ethic of "only 
connect." 
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Charity 
None of us lives up to our potential all the time. None of us is nice all the time. None of 
us is without blame or guilt somewhere in our lives. None of us maintains clear 
judgment all the time. None of us is smart every single day. None of us makes the right 
decision at every important turning point in our lives. When these same lapses of 
judgment and character show up in our students, teachers need to dispense charity, 
not just censure. Of course we have to know when censure is the better corrective, but 
whether charity or censure is most required always deserves serious thought. 
Love 
It has always seemed to me that Shelley offers one of the most perspicuous definitions 
of love available anywhere, and in words that are particularly useful in pedagogical 
discussions. "The great secret of morals," Shelley (1961: 495) says, "is Love; or a going 
out of our nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in 
thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be gready good, must imagine 
intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of 
many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own." To adapt, 
"A teacher, to be gready good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he and 
she must put themselves in the place of the student and of many students; the pains 
and pleasures of students must become the teachers' own." If we cannot as teachers 
learn to see things from the students' point of view, if we have no intuitions about 
where their resistance or confusions are located, if we cannot be midwife to the joys 
and pains of their developmental progress, if we cannot remember what it was like to 
be buffaloed or riveted by new material, then we lack the love of identification, that 
love that is "a going out of our nature, and <Ill identification of ourselves with the 
beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person not our own." To achieve that 
"going out" as teachers is the most effective strategy for helping students achieve their 
own "leading out" as citizens and moral agents. 
Notice that these features of teacherly ethos completely background 
those features of teacherly life that usually get foregrounded: professional 
standing, disciplinary expertise, intellectual ability, and so on. It's not that 
these are unimportant to good teaching, but they are not sufficient to guaran-
tee it in the absence of the ethical features I have just discussed. Since who we 
are is an intewal part of what we know and what we do, we need to think 
about what goes into "who we are" as carefully as we think about what we 
know and do. 
Good Teachlng-A Definition 
Our lives are a constant attempt to move things from the domain of things as 
we think they are into the domain of things as we would like them to be. Into 
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the gulf between these two domains we invest most of our life's energies, 
where they pile up as the rich humus that nourishes the growth of human cre-
ativity. Teaching is that activity that helps students, at first with the teacher's 
assistance but eventually on their own, not only to criticize the world as it is 
and to imagine an improved version of the world as it might be, but to imagine 
more vividly and productively their own possible contributions to that 
improvement (Gregory 1982). 
A good teacher, one who is not merely friendly but befriends, can help 
students engage in criticism that avoids cynicism and can also help them 
engage in imaginings that avoid solipsism. The teacher who knows how to 
befriend students teaches them how to befriend the world: how to work for the 
humanization of the social order, how to be critical of self without falling into 
self-loathing, how to be critical of others without being thoughtlessly callous, 
and how to be compassionate of others without being unduly sentimental. 
Socrates was a teacher who was neither a banker nor a barnstormer 
and who was sometimes not even very friendly either to his interlocutors in 
particular or to Athens in general. Nevertheless, Socrates' vision of what his 
fellow citizens might become made them uncomfortable with what they were, 
and in that discomfort-theirs then, ours now-lie the seeds of growth and 
improvement. Socrates did not say to his interlocutors, "I'm OK, you're OK." 
He did not say, "Learning is hard. Let us proceed in risk-free increments." He 
said, instead, "I'm ignorant. I know practically nothing. But in knowing my 
own ignorance I know more than most of you. Let's talk. Let's see how, in 
sharing good talk, we can together learn more and turn ourselves into better 
people." His is perhaps our best, most enduring, and most inspirational 
model of befriending as good teaching. If students need teachers, and they 
do, to become the best versions of themselves, teachers need students to 
become the best versions of themselves as well, and in this reciprocity of 
mutual assistance all of us, students and teachers alike, may learn, if we are 
careful, how to tend better through education the fragile relations of personal 
development, human community, and civilized conduct. 
Notes 
1. See Brinton 1986 for an incisive analysis of the relation between ethos and argument that 
is highly relevant for teachers. 
2. In an essay that is both brief and insightful, novelist Jay Parini (1997: 92) develops an 
analogy between the teacher's ethos and the writer's voice. 
3. Both Robert Audi (1994) and Peter Marlcie (1990) offer convincing arguments against 
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teacher/student friendships of the buddy, mutually affectionate, and social companion 
kinds. 
4. For more on students' ethos see my "Many-Headed Hydra" (1997b) and "Introductory 
Courses" (1997a). 
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